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Abstract
We introduce an opportunistic scheduling to enhance the physical layer security with transmit antenna selection
(TAS) in multiuser environment. We consider a wireless communication system composed of a single transmitter and
multiple legitimate users in the presence of several eavesdroppers with each node having multiple antennas under
quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel. The transmitter selects the best transmitting antenna and the best user to
maximize signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the selected user. The user and eavesdropper can employ either selection
combining (SC) or maximal ratio combining (MRC) to combine the received signals. New closed-form expressions for
probability of positive secrecy and outage are derived. Moreover, asymptotic analysis reveals the outage diversity gain
and array gain for the proposed scheme. The impact of number of users, eavesdroppers, and antennas on secrecy
performance are clearly demonstrated with mathematical analysis and numerical results.
Keywords: Opportunistic scheduling; Transmit antenna selection; Maximal ratio combining; Selection combining;
Secrecy outage probability
1 Introduction
The security risks are inherent in any wireless network
due to its underlying transmission medium, the airwave,
which is exposed to all sorts of unwanted eavesdroppers.
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are applied at the
upper layer to secure information. However, physical layer
(PHY) security has recently gained considerable atten-
tion as an alternative option to secure information besides
the traditional cryptographic schemes. It can exploit the
uncorrelated nature of the wireless medium for enhanc-
ing the security of wireless systems. The pioneering work
in [1] presented that a noisy communication channel
offers opportunities for non-zero rate secure communi-
cation when the eavesdroppers’ channel is on average a
degraded version of the main channel. This work was
further extended in [2] to characterize the non-degraded
channel. The perfect secrecy capacity was defined in [3]
as the difference between the capacity of main chan-
nel and wiretap channel given that the capacity of the
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former is greater than the latter one under Gaussian chan-
nel. The secrecy capacity will provide the highest value
of communication rate for which coding schemes can
be designed ensuring the perfect secrecy. Moreover, the
existence of the perfect secrecy in wiretap channels was
shown in [4] even when the eavesdropper has a better
average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate
receiver.
Several aspects of wireless communication field have
been studied to improve physical layer security, such as
cooperative networks [5,6], multiaccess channel [7], out-
dated channel state information (CSI) [8,9], channel esti-
mation [10], and cognitive radio [11]. In recent years,
usage of diversity has emerged as a common technique
to enhance PHY security. Several papers exist in liter-
ature [12-19] which employ either transmit or receive
diversity to improve PHY security. In [12], the receive
diversity technique was studied where both legitimate
user and eavesdropper employ maximal ratio combin-
ing (MRC). The authors showed that the use of mul-
tiple receive antennas can enhance security and that
the secrecy outage probability is a function of the ratio
between the number of receive antennas at user and
© 2014 Shrestha and Kwak; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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eavesdropper. Further new results were provided forMRC
technique under correlated channels in [13]. The com-
parison between selection combining (SC) and MRC at
eavesdropper was studied in [14]. The authors illustrated
that MRC at eavesdropper severely degrades the perfor-
mance compared to SC at eavesdropper. Beamforming
technique is studied in [15] for minimizing the transmit
power to a prespecified signal-to-interference-plus-noise-
ratio (SINR) at the receiver. However, it should be noted
that the transmission side can be highly complex as well
as the cost may rise with the increase in the number
of antennas. To overcome such issues, transmit antenna
selection (TAS) has been proposed in [16-19] which also
exploits transmit diversity at the expense of a generally
acceptable loss in performance. It uses a single radio fre-
quency (RF) chain instead of several parallel RF sections,
which reduces cost, complexity, power consumption, and
size.
In [16], performance of TAS was examined in the pres-
ence of single receiver and eavesdropper both equipped
with single antenna. The authors further extended the
work in [17] to a scenario consisting of a sophisticated
multiple antenna eavesdropper employing MRC. In [18],
use of TAS for security enhancement was examined where
the receiver and eavesdropper can employ either MRC or
SC under Nakagami-m fading channels. The superiority
of MRC over SC was established by the authors. Perfor-
mance of TAS with antenna correlation at the receiver
and eavesdropper has been studied in [19]. The authors
demonstrated that when the average SNR of the main
channel is at medium and high levels, higher correlation
at the receiver exerts more detrimental effects on secrecy
than higher correlation at the eavesdropper. Opportunis-
tic scheduling policy for PHY security has been discussed
in [20], but the authors have addressed only MAC layer
policies.
In this paper, we consider a single transmitter with
multiple active users and several passive eavesdroppers
each equipped with multiple antennas in contrast to
[16-18] and [20]. We propose an opportunistic scheduling
along with TAS at transmitter. A similar case with single
eavesdropper is analyzed in [21]. However, we extend the
work in [21] to the case of multiple non-colluding eaves-
droppers and receivers which can employ either MRC or
SC. MRC may be employed to maximize the SNR as it
is an optimum combining technique, while SC may be
employed for its simplicity. As different users experience
different channel environments at a given moment, an
opportunistic scheduling can maximize the transmission
data rate with an exactly known CSI of all users [22].
With such multiuser diversity, opportunistic scheduling
can be a promising technique to improve PHY security
where the secrecy capacity is severely limited by SNR of
eavesdroppers. In addition, use of TAS with MRC or SC
further improves the performance with transmit diversity
and receive diversity, respectively. Overall, the proposed
scheme allows simultaneous exploitation of multiuser
diversity, transmit diversity, and receive diversity.
Notation The superscript T denotes transposition; E{·}
denotes statistical expectation; IN is the N × N identity
matrix; ‖ x ‖ denotes the norm of a complex valued vector
x, i.e.,
√
xHx; CN (μ, σ 2) denotes the complex Gaussian
distribution with mean μ and variance σ 2; P(x) denotes
the probability of an event x.
2 Proposed scheme
2.1 Systemmodel
We consider a wireless network composed of one trans-
mitter referred to as Alice, K as the number of users and
W as the number of eavesdroppers as shown in Figure 1.
Alice is equipped with LA antennas while each legitimate
user and eavesdropper are equipped withLB and LE anten-
nas, respectively. We assume all channels are quasi-static
Rayleigh fading. We also assume that there exists a feed-
back channel between each legitimate user and the trans-
mitter. At the legitimate receiver side, each user selects the
best transmit antenna having the highest channel SNR.
Each user feedbacks the selected antenna index to Alice.
The scheduler at Alice finally selects a single user with cor-
responding indexed antenna having highest SNR values
out of K users. We refer the single selected user as Bob.
On the other hand, we consider that Alice possesses only
average SNR and no other information about the chan-
nel state of eavesdroppers. Moreover, all the channels are
considered to be mutually independent. From the eaves-
droppers’s point of view, the opportunistically selected
single best user along with optimum TAS scheme appears
to be a random strategy, as the main channel between Bob
and Alice and the wiretap channel between eavesdroppers
and Alice are uncorrelated.We need to consider the eaves-
dropper with maximum possible SNR link for our anal-
ysis as it denotes the maximal information leakage. We
refer the eavesdropper with maximum SNR as Eve from
herein.
The message block S is encoded into the codeword c =
[c(1), .., c(i), .., c(n)]. The codeword is designed in such a
way that it is suitable to be transmitted over the selected
channel. We focus on measuring the achievable level of
secrecy rather than the actual code design. The chan-





{|c(i)|2} = P where P is the average transmit
signal power [13].
Alice selects Bob to achieve the largest post-processing
SNR when selecting the best transmit antenna based on
the information provided by each legitimate users through
their respective feedback channels. MRC technique at Bob
will combine the multiple received signals from different
receiving antennas according to the gain of each channel.













Figure 1 Systemmodel for secure opportunistic scheduling with TAS in presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
The received signal at Bob in this case can be expressed as
yMRCB (i) = hB,uc(i) + nB,u, (1)
where hB,u =[hB,1, hB,2, ..., hB,LB]T is a complex channel
vector and nB,u∼ CN (0, σ 2BILB). From (1), the instanta-




Under this scenario, Eve can apply either MRC or SC to
decode the intercepted signal. The received signal for Eve
by applying MRC can be written as
yMRC/MRCE (i) = hE,vc(i) + nE,v, (2)
where hE,v =[ hE,1, hE,2, ..., hE,LE]T is a complex channel
vector and nE,v∼ CN (0, σ 2E ILE). From (2), the instanta-




other hand, the received signal for Eve by applying SC can
be written as
yMRC/SCE (i) = hEc(i) + nE , (3)
where hE is a complex channel coefficient and nE is addi-
tive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with noise variance





Considering the simplicity and cost effectiveness, Bob
can employ SC instead ofMRC. The received signal at Bob
for such scenario can be expressed as
ySCB (i) = gBc(i) + nB, (4)
where gB is a complex channel coefficient and nB is
AWGNwith noise variance σ 2B . The instantaneous SNR of




Asmentioned above, Eve can apply eitherMRC or SC to
decode the messages under this scenario as well. For Bob
with SC, the received signal at Eve while applying MRC
can be expressed as
ySC/MRCE (i) = gE,vc(i) + nE,v, (5)
where gE,v =[ gE,1, gE,2, ..., gE,LE]T is a complex channel
vector and nE,v∼ CN (0, σ 2E ILE). From (5), the instanta-




Likewise, the received signal for Eve by applying SC can
be written as
ySC/SCE (i) = gEc(i) + nE , (6)
where gE is a complex channel coefficient and nE is
AWGN with noise variance σ 2E . From (6), the instanta-





We deduce the probability density function (PDF) and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) in this section to
facilitate the analysis of secrecy performance. The PDF
and CDF of instantaneous SNR for the kth user employ-
ingMRCwith LB antennas can be expressed in the form of































where (·) and (·, ·) are complete and incomplete
gamma functions, respectively (Equations (8.339.1) and
(8.352.2) in [24]).
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Using order statistics [25], we can derive the CDF and













































{‖ hB,u ‖2} and α = m+1γ¯B . Likewise, ai















, where ai can be recursively
calculated by




t(m+ 1) − i
t! ai−t , for 2 ≤ i < m(LB − 1),
ai = 1[(LB − 1)! ]m , for i = m(LB − 1).
(11)
The expressions in (9) and (10) can be obtained by using
binomial expansion at first which results the term with










power series can be further expanded by using Equation
0.314 in [24]. This finite series expansion is possible as the
first term within incomplete gamma function in (8), i.e.,
the number of antennas at Bob LB has always integer value
[26].
In a similar fashion, by using the order statistics, we can








(−1)ne−γB nγ¯B , (12)











The selection of best antenna at Alice seems random
from Eve’s point of view. As there areW number of eaves-
droppers in the network each equipped with LE antennas,
the diversity for Eve limits to multiuser diversity and
receive diversity while there is no transmit diversity. The
PDF and CDF for Eve employing MRC irrespective of
MRC or SC at Bob can be obtained using similar order
statistics and mathematical steps as in (9) and (10) by

























































; and γ¯E is average SNR of
the eavesdroppers’ channel. We note that the coefficient
bj can be recursively calculated as ai described in (11).
Finally, the CDF and PDF of Evewith SC can be obtained
























From [3], the secrecy capacity over Gaussian wiretap
channel is given by the difference between the main chan-
nel capacity and wiretap channel capacity. Since block-
faded channel is assumed in our system model, both the
channels can be regarded as complex Gaussian channels.
The capacity of Bob’s channel is given by
CB = log2(1 + max1≤i≤KLA γBi) = log2(1 + γB). (18)
Similarly, the capacity of Eve’s channel is given by
CE = log2(1 + max1≤j≤W γEj ) = log2(1 + γE), (19)
where γB and γE are the instantaneous SNR of Bob
and Eve, respectively, regardless of any receive diversity
scheme.
Hence, under perfect secrecy constraint, the instanta-
neous secrecy capacity of Bob in the presence of multiple
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CB − CE, if γB ≥ γE
0, otherwise. (20)
3 Performancemetrics
3.1 Positive secrecy probability
Since themain channel betweenAlice and Bob is indepen-
dent from the wiretap channel between Alice and Eve, the
existence probability of a non-zero secrecy capacity can be
calculated as












where fB(·) and FE(·) are the PDF and CDF of γB and
γE , respectively. As we have already derived the PDF of
γB and CDF of γE for respective schemes in Section 2.2,
the probability of positive secrecy for each scheme can be
easily derived by simply substituting the values and using
Equation 3.351.3 in [24] as shown in (22) to (25):























































































































3.2 Secrecy outage probability
Since Alice does not have full CSI of any eavesdropper,
we have to characterize the outage probability of secrecy
capacity. The secrecy outage probability can be defined
as the probability that the achievable secrecy rate is less
than a given rate of transmission Rs such that Rs > 0.
The transmission rate below Rs cannot ensure the secure
transmission. The outage can occur in two ways: firstly,
when SNR at Eve exceeds to that of Bob and Eve is able to
decode the message; secondly, when SNR at Bob exceeds
to that of Eve but still Bob is unable to decode themessage.
As such, we can formulate the secrecy outage probability
[18,19] using the total probability theorem as follows:
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)P(γB > γE)
+ P(Cs < Rs|γB ≤ γE)P(γB ≤ γE). (26)
Since the secrecy capacity does not exist when γB ≤ γE
and we always assume that Rs > 0, we get P(Cs < Rs|γB ≤
γE) = 1. Therefore, (26) becomes
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)P(γB > γE)+P(γB ≤ γE).
(27)
The first term in (27) can be simplified as
P(Cs<Rs|γB>γE)P(γB>γE) = P(log2(1 + γB) − log2(1 + γE)
< Rs|γB > γE)P(γB > γE)
= P(γB<2Rs (1+γE)− 1|γB>γE)








where d= 2Rs . The second term in (27) can be simplified as










fE(γE)FB(d(1 + γE) − 1)dγE , (30)
where FB(·) is the CDF of γB and fE(·) is the PDF of γE. As
we have already derived the CDF of γB and PDF of γE for
respective schemes, we simply proceed to obtain the out-
age probability expression for each scheme by replacing
the respective values in (30). New closed-form expression
Shrestha and Kwak EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2014, 2014:33 Page 6 of 9
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/33
of the exact secrecy outage probability for each scheme is






























































































































Remark 1. By substituting K = W = LA = LB = LE = 1
in (31) to (34), all the schemes reduce to the special case
of single transmitter, user, and eavesdropper with single
antenna which corresponds to Equation 9 in [4].
Remark 2. A special case of single transmitter and user
with single antenna and an eavesdropper with multiple
antennas can be obtained with K = W = LA = LB = 1
in (31) to (34) such that (31) and (33) corresponds to
Equation 10 in [14] while (32) and (34) corresponds to
Equation 11 in [14].
This verifies that the expression derived is consistent
with the results from the existing literature.
3.3 Asymptotic behavior
Although the closed-form expression for the outage prob-
ability derived in (31) to (34) enable us to evaluate the
performance of TAS scheme, its complex forms do not
allow us to gain valuable insights on how the parame-
ter K, W, LA, LB, and LE affect the overall performance.
Therefore, we perform asymptotic analysis in the sequel.
As γ¯B → ∞ in the high SNR regime, the asymptotic out-
age probability for both Bob and Eve’s channel with MRC
is given by
PMRC/MRC(a)out (Rs) = (MRC/MRCγ¯B)−	, (35)
where diversity order is 	 = KLALB and array gain























(LE + j + m)





Proof. Further discussion of proof of (35) is presented in
Appendix 1.
Following the similar steps in Appendix 1, we can obtain
the asymptotic outage probability for Bob with MRC and
Eve with SC as follows
PMRC/SC(a)out (Rs) = (MRC/SCγ¯B)−	, (37)
where diversity order is 	 = KLALB and array gain
























Similarly, the asymptotic outage probability for Bob
with SC and Eve with MRC can be obtained as
PSC/MRC(a)out (Rs) = (SC/MRCγ¯B)−	, (39)
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where diversity order is 	 = KLALB and array gain





























Proof. Further discussion of proof of (37) is presented in
Appendix 2.
Following the similar steps in Appendix 2, we can obtain
the asymptotic outage probability for both Bob and Eve
with SC as follows:
PSC/SC(a)out (Rs) = (SC/SCγ¯B)−	, (41)
























We compare the performance difference between MRC
and SC at Bob in terms of simple ratio of secrecy array










It is obvious that MRC/MRC is superior to SC/MRC
and MRC/SC is superior to SC/SC by an SNR gap of
10
LB log (LB! ). Moreover, as γ¯E → ∞, the outage probability
becomes one resulting absolute absence of secret commu-
nication. Also, the outage probability becomes 0 and 1 at
the extreme values of Rs = 0 and Rs → ∞ respectively as
per our expectation.
4 Numerical results
Figure 2 shows the probability of positive secrecy as a
function of γ¯B at selected values of γ¯E for various schemes
when K = 4, W = 3, and LA = LB = LE = 2. This figure
highlights that the probability of positive secrecy increases
with γ¯B while decreases with the increase in value of γ¯E.
In both cases, non-zero secrecy capacity exists even when
Eve’s channel has a higher average SNR relative to Bob’s
channel. It is also obvious that MRC at Bob and SC at Eve
provides the best performance while SC at Bob and MRC















= 5 dB = 15 dB
Figure 2 Probability of non-zero secrecy versus γ¯B for selected
values of γ¯E .
at Eve results the worst performance of all four possible
schemes.
Figure 3 compares the secrecy outage probability versus
γ¯B for selected values of LA with K = W = LB = LE = 2,
γ¯E = 15 dB and Rs = 0.1 bit/s/Hz. There is a remark-
able decrease in the secrecy outage probability when we
increase LA from 1 to 4. This shows the improvement
in performance from transmit diversity provided by TAS
at Alice. For example, at Pout = 10−3 under MRC/MRC
scheme, a gain of nearly 5.5 dB is achieved with LA = 4
compared to that of LA = 1.
In Figure 4, the asymptotic and exact secrecy outage
probabilities for different schemes are shown at selected
values of γ¯E for each scheme to avoid cluttering in the
figure. We consider K = W = LA = LB = LE =
2, and Rs = 0.1 bit/s/Hz for this case. We can observe



















Figure 3 Secrecy outage probability versus γ¯B for selected
values of LA .
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Figure 4 Asymptotic and exact secrecy outage probability
versus γ¯B for selected values of γ¯E .
that the asymptotic curve merges with exact curve in
the high SNR regime. Moreover, the parallel asymp-
totic lines indicate the same diversity order in all four
schemes. For the case of K = LA = LB = 2, the diversity
order is found to be nearly 8 in all four schemes, which
verifies the diversity order obtained in (35), (37), (39),
and (41).
In Figure 5, we show the secrecy outage probability
versus γ¯B for different values of LB and LE with K =
W = LA = 2, γ¯E = 10 dB and Rs = 0.1 bit/s/Hz under
MRC/MRC scheme. It is found that for fixed value of
LB, the increase in LE will increase Pout(Rs). However,
there is no improvement in the diversity order which is
evident from the parallel lines for different values of LE.


















LB = 3 = 2
LB = 4 = 2
LB = 2 = 3
LB = 2 = 4
(dB)
Figure 5 The secrecy outage probability versus target secrecy
rate Rs for different values of LB and LE.
To compensate the performance degradation by num-
ber of antennas at Eve, we can increase the number of
antennas at Bob. We can notice that a single addition
of antenna at Bob sharply decreases the secrecy outage
probability.
Figure 6 illustrates the secrecy outage probability ver-
sus target secrecy rate, Rs for different values of K with
W = LA = LB = LE = 2, γ¯B = 10 dB and γ¯E = 0 dB. For
K = 1, the proposed scheme corresponds to the scheme
discussed in [16] and [17] but with the presence of multi-
ple eavesdroppers. It is clear that employing opportunistic
scheduling drastically improves the outage performance
and higher target secrecy rate can be achieved. The per-
formance improves with increase in K but it nearly satu-
rates at higher values of K.
5 Conclusions
We proposed an opportunistic scheduling with TAS to
enhance physical layer security. At the transmitter, a sin-
gle antenna is selected to maximize the instantaneous
SNR of the main channel, while at the receiver and the
eavesdropper, MRC or SC is applied. The scheduler at
Alice selects a single best user out of K users. The
security performance metrics, i.e., probability of positive
secrecy and secrecy outage probability are improved by
combination of transmit diversity, receive diversity, and
multiuser diversity simultaneously. The asymptotic anal-
ysis demonstrated that the outage diversity order of the
proposed scheme is given by the product of the num-
ber of legitimate receivers and the number of antennas
at the transmitter and receiver. We can also conclude that
the secrecy outage probability is almost independent of
the number of antennas and eavesdroppers in high SNR
region.























Figure 6 The secrecy outage probability versus target secrecy
rate Rs forW = LA = LB = LE = 2.




As γ¯B → ∞, the CDF of Bob’s channel with MRC can be
approximated as



































where O denotes higher-order terms such that f (x) =
O(g(x)) implies that there exists a non-negative constant
τ so that lim
x→∞
f (x)
g(x) ≤ τ .We select only the first order terms




As γ¯B → ∞, the CDF of Bob’s channel with SC can be
approximated as




















Neglecting higher terms in (45) and substituting (15) and
(45) in (30), we can obtain (37).
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